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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on environmental and sustainability education (ESE)
in the context of the topical post-truth debate. It aims to progress the-
oretical research as well as empirical investigations on how ESE practi-
ces can avoid the pitfalls involved in an objectivist as well as a relativist
approach to teaching and learning. After elaborating the problems
implied in both these approaches, the article explores concepts devel-
oped in science and technology studies (STS) that have the potential to
inspire ESE research and practice to move beyond this problematic
dichotomy: Latour’s ‘matters of concern’ and ‘compositionism’ and
Jasanoff’s ‘co-production’ and ‘socio-technical imaginaries’. Drawing on
pragmatist educational theory the author develops a conceptual frame-
work that serves as a theoretical model for investigations of how ESE
subject matter and teaching methods can be introduced, handled and
experienced in a way that moves beyond the dualism of objectivism
versus relativism. Building on the work of scholars who have connected
Dewey’s pragmatic, transactional perspective to the domain of didactical
research, it is shown how this theoretical model can be operationalised
for empirical studies with the help of well-chosen analytical methods.
The article is concluded with some reflections on the limitations and
potential of the presented framework.
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Introduction
‘Post-truth’ has been chosen as the 2016 word of the year by the Oxford Dictionaries. ‘How could
truth become passe?’, Higgins (2016, n.p.) wonders in a column in Nature. Scientists, she argues,
should be shocked by the idea of post-truth, by the observation of increasing public tolerance of
inaccurate, undefended allegations and outright denials of facts, and especially by the lack of
public indignation when policymakers claim disbelief in response to scientific consensus on
issues such as climate change. ‘They should speak up when scientific findings are … treated as
mere matters of faith’ and ‘must keep reminding society of the importance of the social mission
of science — to provide the best information possible as the basis for public policy’. Even if one
is, indeed, shocked by seeing how serious interest in issues and intellectual virtues such as crit-
ical thinking, sustained inquiry and revision of beliefs on the basis of evidence is ‘treated as the
idiosyncrasy of wonks’ (Higgins 2016, n.p.), one may as well be reluctant of adopting fact-based
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politics as the ultimate alternative for the currently reviled ‘fact-free politics’. After all, the trad-
itional allocation of tasks between science and politics within which scientists are assumed to
provide objective, established facts as a basis for rational decision-making has also been the sub-
ject of criticism. Controversies over sustainability issues show that attempts to settle issues by
appealing to expert knowledge very often get bogged down in a fierce antagonism between
expertise and counter-expertise (Sarewitz 2004; Goeminne 2012). Furthermore, over the last
decennia the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has created an integrative under-
standing of the societal origins, dynamics and consequences of science and technology. Viewing
science as a socially and culturally situated set of practices contrasts sharply with the positivist
conception which draws a clear dividing line between science and society. Notably, STS research
has argued that scientific ‘facts’ and ‘truth’ do not enter the social world fully formed; rather
they are produced in the course of working out political and social arguments (Latour and
Woolgar, 1979/1986; Daston and Galison 2007).
The post-truth debate bears resemblance to a long-lasting discussion in the field of
Environmental and Sustainability Education (ESE) research. Obviously, finding appropriate ways
to deal with ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ is a key pedagogic and didactic challenge in all forms of educa-
tion. And it is not very surprising that especially when education is faced with environmental
and sustainability issues, pressing questions about and struggles with truth and facts emerge.
Issues such as climate change, loss of biodiversity, resource depletion, and gentrification often
do not fit into the dominant and deeply rooted Western worldview, with its strict division
between ‘objective’ facts and truths versus ‘subjective’ values, preferences and beliefs (Latour
2010; Goeminne 2011). They are characterised by an inextricable entanglement of social, political,
human aspects on the one hand and material, technical, natural elements on the other. Hence,
ESE educators and researchers are challenged by the question what constitutes good teaching in
relation to such issues. Many ESE scholars (e.g. Ashley 2000; €Ohman 2008; €Ohman and €Ostman
2008; €Ostman 2010; Sund and €Ohman 2014; Garrison et al. 2015; Lysgaard and Fjelsted 2015;
Van Poeck and Lysgaard 2016; Van Poeck et al. 2016) have pointed out risks involved in what
we could see as the pedagogical equivalent for the above problematized dichotomy of ‘fact-
based’ and ‘fact-free’ politics, that is, either an objectivist or a relativist approach to teaching and
learning in the face of environmental and sustainability issues. The former sees the factual
account of the state of the planet as a non-negotiable basis for normative guidelines on how to
think and act that should be transmitted through teaching and learning. The latter, on the other
hand, is grounded in an understanding of pluralism as a sheer fact of plurality, resulting in an
anything-goes spirit that grants every opinion equal value. Highlighting the problems involved in
both extremes these scholars argue for theoretical, methodological as well as didactical frame-
works that move beyond the relativism versus objectivism dichotomy. A major challenge for ESE,
then, is to organise and select subject matter and teaching methods that enable to simultan-
eously take into account nonhuman objects, science, nature, materiality, etc. on the one hand,
and human subjects, society, politics, ethics, discourse etc. on the other. Not as two separated
and mutually exclusive spheres – which would leave us with nothing but the choice between
objectivism or relativism – but as intimately entangled and inextricable dimensions.
This article aims to progress ESE scholarship in this respect. Its main ambition is to foster the-
oretical research as well as empirical investigations in how ESE practices can avoid the pitfalls
involved in an objectivist as well as a relativist approach. Therefore, I develop a conceptual
framework that should enable ESE researchers to examine teaching and learning in ESE practices
as to whether – and, if so, how – the inextricable entanglement of social, political, human
aspects on the one hand and material, technical, natural elements on the other is reflected in
the content (subject matter) and process (teaching methods) of ESE. In the remainder of the art-
icle, I will first further elaborate the problems implied in approaches to ESE that are grounded in
the objectivism versus relativism dualism. Then, I explore and describe concepts developed by
STS scholars Bruno Latour and Sheila Jasanoff that have the potential to inspire ESE research and
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practice to move beyond this problematic dichotomy. Next, I engage with the challenging ques-
tion how these theoretical, epistemological perspectives can be translated into the domain of
didactics. Drawing on pragmatist educational theory I develop a conceptual framework that
serves as a theoretical model for investigations of how ESE subject matter and teaching methods
can be introduced, handled and experienced in a way that moves beyond the dualism of object-
ivism versus relativism. Building on the work of scholars who have connected John Dewey’s
pragmatic, transactional perspective to the domain of didactical research, I show how this theor-
etical model can be operationalised for empirical studies with the help of well-chosen analytical
methods. I conclude the article with some reflections on the implications, limitations and poten-
tial of the presented framework.
ESE: Caught in a dualist worldview?
As argued, ESE educators face the challenging question how to deal with truth, facts, values,
preferences and beliefs in their education practice. Distinguishing between three ‘selective
traditions’ in ESE, €Ohman (2008) and Sandell et al. (2005) interestingly capture how different
answers to this question have resulted in very different education practices in terms of the selec-
tion and organisation of the subject matter as well as the selection of teaching methods. First,
the fact-based tradition builds on the assumption that only science can provide a reliable founda-
tion for our knowledge about environmental and sustainability issues and that scientific facts
and models have sole importance as to guiding teaching and learning. Hence, the issues at stake
are primarily treated as knowledge problems. If students acquire the proper factual knowledge
about environmental and sustainability issues, it is assumed, they will automatically become
competent in dealing with them. The main objection raised against this approach, is the omis-
sion of the value dimension of sustainable development. As a response to this shortcoming, a
second, normative tradition emerged. Here, the main task of education is considered to be its
contribution to the value-laden ambition to create a more sustainable society: teaching students
sustainability-oriented values and attitudes in order to change their behaviour in the desired dir-
ection. Discussions among experts and politicians on the basis of scientific facts about the cur-
rent state of the world are assumed to deliver universal solutions to environmental and
developmental problems which are then supposed to be disseminated through curricula and syl-
labuses. Also this normative approach has been criticised. A major objection raised is that envir-
onmental and sustainability issues involve conflicts between different values, ideologies,
priorities and strategies which cannot be dissolved by simply referring to science as a universal
and neutral foundation which provides answers to questions about how people should live their
lives and develop society. ‘Although there might be agreement on certain facts, the judgements
of these facts and the way of valuing the consequences of different measures may differ as a
consequence of personal or contextual aspects’, €Ohman (2008, 20) argues. Furthermore, a norma-
tive approach is criticised for threatening education’s emancipatory potential and its democratic
obligation. Turning education into a political tool to create a specific predetermined society, it is
argued, reduces it to mere indoctrination. The third, pluralistic tradition, in contrast, emphasises
the democratic mission of education claiming that involving diverse interest groups, supporting
free opinion-making and enhancing students’ competence to act in a conscious way and to par-
ticipate in debates, discussions and decisions should be the main goals of ESE. This approach
focuses on promoting different perspectives, views and values when dealing with various ques-
tions and problems concerning the future of our world. Deliberative discussions are considered
to be an essential part of pluralistic ESE and should result in finding common answers to value-
related issues, or recognising and accepting different standpoints. An often mentioned objection
against a pluralistic approach is the risk of falling into anything goes relativism. Striving to illu-
minate different opinions could be interpreted as all alternative actions being equally right and
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all values equally good. This critique, however, is only valid within a dualistic perspective as it is
‘intimately associated with a traditional realist philosophical framework and the presumption
that we are stuck with two incommensurable options concerning our attitudes to the right and
the good, namely objectivism – that it is possible to anchor moral beliefs in an external and eter-
nal foundation, or relativism – that no such foundations exist and that all opinions about the
right and the good are merely arbitrary constructions relative to a specific paradigm, theoretical
framework, culture or form of life’ (€Ohman 2008, 21).
Before moving on to a critique of this dichotomist worldview, I want to illustrate its strong
influence on ESE practice with a concrete example stemming from a case study of an environ-
mental education project for schools in Belgium (see also Van Poeck 2013), In this case study,
two very different ways of approaching the ecological footprint as subject matter were identified.
First, a primary school developed an ‘Ecological Footprint Booklet’ aiming to raise awareness
among students and their parents about our ecological impact. The booklet was created by
teachers and students and consisted of behaviour precepts and drawings. The teachers selected
behaviour guidelines to reduce one’s ecological footprint (e.g. taking a shower instead of a bath)
and the pupils provided each precept with a matching drawing (see Figure 1).
This is an example of an objectivist approach built on the assumption that we can anchor
moral beliefs and normative behavioural do’s and don’ts in an external and eternal foundation,
i.c. a factual, well measurable account of our ecological impact and effective ways to reduce it.
As the drawing interestingly reveals, the students and their teachers were obviously convinced
of which kind of behaviour is desirable (see: ‘!’) and which should be avoided (see: ‘⦸ !’). The
staging of an angel versus a devil as key figures reflects the morally normative stand. The eco-
logical footprint, here, emerges as an objective matter of fact that can – and should – guide sub-
jective, individual and societal choices and decisions.
In a second, secondary school a religion teacher used the subject of unequally distributed
ecological footprints to address and discuss the issues of social justice and solidarity in relation
to sustainability. After watching a documentary about ‘the Low Impact Man’ who tried to obtain
a lifestyle within sustainable ecological limits by complying with drastic behaviour precepts (no
meat, no car, raw food, no travelling, taking showers with cold rain water, etc.) the students dis-
cussed the question whether or not they would be willing to live within the limits of a global
average fair share of 1,8 ha. The outcome of this open-ended deliberation was that the students
decided that they would prefer not to. And that was the end of the matter. No further discussion
about the implications of this preference. Hence, the ecological footprint emerges as a matter of
individual values and choices, i.e. as an arbitrary construction without any foundations resulting
in a relativistic tolerance rendering any opinion or preference equally valid.
Both approaches, I will argue, are each in their own way problematic as the underlying dualis-
tic worldview that is dominant in our modern Western society and that sharply separates facts
from values, materiality from discourse, nature from society, epistemology from ethics and
Figure 1. Drawing Ecological Footprint Booklet.
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aesthetics, objectivity from subjectivity, science from politics, etc. contravenes the ontology of
sustainability issues that are constituted by an inextricably entanglement of all these dimensions.
In the next section, I underpin this argument with critiques raised on the dichotomist perspective
implied in this worldview.
Objectivism versus relativism: Four critiques
Since the Enlightenment, the Cartesian duality that installed a separation of human conscious-
ness from nature increasingly affected our modern world which divided itself into the distinct
value spheres of epistemology (reason, science, technology, etc.), ethics (morality, justice, reli-
gion, etc.) and aesthetics (artistic creation, aesthetic criticism, beauty, etc.) (Garrison et al. 2015).
This ‘Modernist Constitution’, as Latour (2010) calls such a dualistic worldview, has been criticised
for several reasons.
First, it is at odds with what happens in practice. The Modernist Constitution denies to a large
extent the ‘social embeddedness of scientific practice’ and the situated and human character of
the genesis of scientific knowledge (Goeminne 2012, 151; see also e.g. Jasanoff 2004; Latour
2005) at the same time as it fails to seriously acknowledge the impact of materiality and techno-
scientific artefacts on human behaviour, social life, political decision-making, etc. (e.g. Latour
1988; Marres 2010, 2011; Goeminne and Franc¸ois 2010). . Drawing on a historical and constructiv-
ist analysis of climate science in the making, Goeminne (2012) illustrates how the current practice
of climate modelling and the prevailing scientific construction of the climate is a contingent
social outcome of a dynamic interplay between problem framing and solution framing driven by
concerns such as globalism, simulation and prediction. This, he emphasises, is not the only pos-
sible, unique answer to an unequivocal question.
Second, a dualistic worldview inevitably brings about a very partial view of reality bounded and
distorted by either ‘naïve realism’ or ‘absolute idealism’ (Lysgaard and Fjelsted 2015). Constructing a
two-tiered world of, on the one hand, ‘matters of fact’ that ‘speak by themselves’ and are beyond
dispute, and, on the other, disputable human assertions, opinions and preferences, i.e. ‘matters of
value’ (Latour 2004a) drastically reduces the epistemological space. The only positions left, then, are
either an objectivist or a relativist perspective (Latour 2010). Yet, highly complex, uncertain, con-
tested, historically situated, far reaching… issues such as sustainability problems never occupy one
of these two positions (Latour 2004a). We face a proliferation of states of affairs that neither fit in
the list of ‘mere’ values, opinions, preferences, etc. nor in the list of undisputable facts. Thinking
from within the Modernist Constitution only allows oscillating between the separated worlds of facts
and values in an attempt to mend what got artificially divided but what, in reality, never got broken
in the first place. Ironically, Garrison et al. (2015) argue, attempts to counteract objectivism – in
which values, opinions, preferences, interests, passions… are subordinated to matters of fact – by
prioritising ethical and aesthetical values over epistemological ones merely invert the hierarchy of
separated values spheres, thereby accepting the initially constructed separations. Hence, it is vital to
create perspectives where facts and values can emerge in their interconnectedness.
A third point of criticism is that this dualistic worldview neutralises the political dimension of
the issues addressed by removing from view the struggles over inclusion and exclusion (Mouffe
2005), i.e. over what to take into account, what to care about, and who is allowed to decide on
that. The distinction between, on the one hand, undisputable facts which some enlightened peo-
ple have unmediated access to and on the other hand disputable human assertions, opinions
and values (Latour 2010; Decuypere et al. 2011) neutralises the political space. Science is
assumed to inform political decision making with judgements that are beyond question. Truth is
understood in a one-dimensional way: there exists only one truth, ‘logical truth’ (Boehm 2002),
which is exclusively graspable by means of the sciences (Goeminne and Franc¸ois 2010) and
results in objective, neutral, a-political matters of fact. This paralyses political struggles in the
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sense that it does not allow contesting and discussing alternative visions of society (Goeminne
2011). What is removed from view, ironically, is the very political character of this epistemology
(Latour 2010), i.e. that science composes its issues in a non-neutral way. Every construction,
including a scientific one, divides and separates, includes some concerns while excluding others.
Acknowledging that a problem is never ‘given’ (as a matter of fact) or ‘chosen’ (as a matter of
preferences, interests or values) but instead ‘concernfully formulated, framed, given shape’
(Goeminne and Franc¸ois 2010, 118) opens-up a political space for discussions over ‘topical truth’
(Boehm 2002), that is, over the question ‘what issue is at stake?’ and which concerns, values,
facts, etc. should be taken into account.
‘(W)hereas logical truth is a measure of the answers of science in terms of the correspondence
between matters of fact and a reality out there, topical truth can be thought of as a measure of
the questions of science in terms of the relevance and adequacy with regard to what is consid-
ered to be the matter of concern’ (Goeminne 2011, 632).
Finally, the boundaries of the Modernist Constitution limit the space for newness and creativity.
This is particularly problematic since urgent and far-reaching sustainability issues – too persistent
to tackle with routine ways of problem-solving – demand new ways of thinking and doing. Yet, in
a dualist world of facts and values critique prevails over creativity. Moreover, as Latour (2004a)
argues, the kind of critique that is possible within this reductionist and distorted epistemological
space is not likely to provide creative solutions for sustainability issues. Both factual disputes over
logical truth and endless deconstruction and debunking (Goeminne and Franc¸ois 2010) of opin-
ions, values, concerns, etc. bring disputes over vital matters of concern to a deadlock. The problem
with the former is that it denies the social embeddedness of matters of fact and, thereby, the legit-
imacy of a struggle over topical truth. The latter, in turn, risks to fall into undue anything-goes
relativism by rendering the lack of scientific certainty – ‘inherent in the construction of facts’
(Latour 2004a, 227) – into a foundation for uncompromising deconstruction that bears strong
resemblances with artificially maintained controversies such as climate change denial (Latour, ibid.).
Hence, as Garrison et al. (2015, 184-185) argue, ‘we must be not only critical, but also creative’ as
mere criticism makes it impossible to perceive dramatically different possibilities. They introduce
the notion of ‘educative moment’ to refer to situations where creative possibilities for the future
open up as a result of ‘critical and creative inquiry’. As Dewey (1934) explains, ‘imaginative experi-
ences’ of possibilities open-up a space for not only criticism but also creativity:
‘A sense of possibilities that are unrealized and that might be realized are when they are put
in contrast with actual conditions, the most penetrating “criticism” of the latter that can be
made. It is by a sense of possibilities opening up before us that we become aware of constric-
tions that hem us in and of the burdens that oppress.’ (Dewey 1934)
These four critiques are helpful to return to the ESE examples on the ecological footprint and
to further specify why both an objectivist and a relativist approach to teaching and learning are
problematic. By framing the ecological footprint either as a matter of fact or as a matter of value,
the students are offered a very partial, distorted view of reality in which the entanglement of
facts and values, knowledge and preferences, etc. is removed from view. At the same time, this
closes the door for a political perspective on the distribution of ecological footprints. The ques-
tions what is actually at stake and which/whose concerns should be included or excluded are
either foreclosed by predetermined answers based on matters of fact or rendered irrelevant in
an anything-goes spirit. Furthermore, the examples also fail to take seriously what happens in
concrete practices: First, the practice of calculating and measuring footprints of individuals,
groups, activities, etc. as a very situated, socially embedded and human practice1 and, second,
the way in which people actually make choices by carefully weighing a complex of factors in
which facts and values are intimately entangled2. Finally, both examples leave little room for cre-
ativity. The only options the primary school pupils seem to have, is either to comply with or to
violate the behaviour guidelines in the booklet, not to explore and confront radically different
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options. Also the relativist approach hinders critical and creative inquiry of what it means and
implies to adopt one’s lifestyle to the planet’s ecological limits – or to decide not to.
Although helpful for a better understanding of the problems involved in a dichotomist per-
spective that reduces ESE to either objectivist or relativist approaches, these four critiques are as
such insufficient to analyse or criticise concrete ESE practices. Obviously, my discussion of the
two examples cannot be seen as a thorough empirical analysis. Instead, the cases rather serve as
illustrations of an ideal typical objectivist and relativist approach that allow to highlight and dis-
cuss the problems involved at a very general level. A detailed and critical analysis of what actu-
ally happens in concrete practices, which meaning-making of reality is created by it, whether
and how this opens-up a space for creativity and for the political, etc. demands sophisticated
empirical research. Beyond ontological and epistemological critiques like the ones elaborated
above, this requires a sound and well-suited analytical framework. As argued, this article aims to
contribute to this. First, by developing a conceptual framework that serves as a theoretical model
for investigations of whether and how ESE teaching and learning can move beyond the dichot-
omy of objectivism versus relativism. Next, by showing how this theoretical model can be opera-
tionalised for empirical studies of ESE didactics by connecting it to earlier developed analytical
methods inspired by Dewey’s pragmatic, transactional perspective.
Exploring non-dualistic epistemological concepts
Work done in the field of STS has provided us with theoretical, epistemological concepts that
are not trapped in the dualism of objectivism versus relativism. In the following paragraphs I
describe some concepts elaborated by Bruno Latour and Sheila Jasanoff which, I believe, can
inspire investigations of how ESE practices handle the above elaborated issues.
Compositionism and matters of concern
As already indicated, Bruno Latour criticises the Modernist Constitution and its divide between, on
the one hand, matters of fact that are assumed to be naturally given and objectively knowable and,
on the other, human values, preferences, opinions and assertions that are considered mere subject-
ive, social constructions. By introducing the concept of ‘compositionism’ – in his attempt to write a
‘Compositionist Manifesto’ – he aims to ‘draw attention away from the irrelevant difference between
what is constructed and what is not constructed, toward the crucial difference between what is well
or badly constructed, well or badly composed’ (Latour 2010, 3). The term ‘composition’, with its ori-
gin in the Latin word ‘componere’, reflects that things have to be put together while retaining their
heterogeneity. In line with this, Latour (2004a) elaborates on the notion ‘matters of concern’. Reality,
he argues, cannot be defined by matters of fact. Scientific matters of fact are always also matters of
concern, that is to say, compositions made up of complex interdependencies between nature and
society, between the material and the social. ‘Facts’ never enter the social world fully formed but
are produced, composed (Latour and Woolgar 1979/1986). From this constructivist perspective,
Latour (2010) draws attention to the fact that a composition can also fail, and that what is to be
composed may also be decomposed. Compositionism is thus as far from relativism as it is from uni-
versalism. From the latter, it takes up the task of building a common world, of searching for univer-
sality yet without assuming that this universality is already there, waiting to be unveiled and
discovered. Hence, from relativism it takes up ‘the certainty that this common world has to be built
– i.e. composed, constructed – from utterly heterogeneous parts that will never make a whole, but
at best a fragile, revisable and diverse composite material’ (Latour 2010, 4).
A compositionist stand, Latour (2004a, 2010) argues, also implies a rethinking of what it
means to be critical. Instead of criticising matters of fact by deconstructing and debunking, that
is, by moving away from them and direct one’s attention toward the conditions that made them
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possible, compositionist criticism does not aim to get away from facts but, on the contrary,
closer to them. Criticism, then, is no longer about fighting empiricism but about renewing it by
creating possibilities to bring into attention, explore, and confront a multiplicity of facts, values,
assertions, preferences, commitments, attachments (Marres 2005), etc. in their interconnected-
ness. Doing so opens-up a space for discussions over what Boehm (2002) has called ‘topical
truth’ (see above), that is, over which questions and concerns matter and which ones should
take precedence over the others. This specific form of empiricism, Latour (2004a, 231) explains, is
a return to a ‘stubbornly realist attitude’ dealing no longer with matters of fact but with matters
of concern. Rather than to debunk, this critical urge requires to protect and to care. It is about
adding reality to matters of fact instead of subtracting reality and, as such, reflects a difference
between deconstruction and constructivism.
‘The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one
who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers the partici-
pants arenas in which to gather.’ (Latour 2004a, 246)
Co-production and socio-technical imaginaries
A central aim of STS has been to reveal how the design and development of technological objects
are in constant interplay with the social arrangements that inspire and sustain their production3
(Jasanoff 2015). Human choices and user preferences consciously or unconsciously mark the design
of objects as well as the kinds of behaviour, benefits and risks they seek to encourage, exclude or
regulate. However, Sheila Jasanoff (2015) emphasises, science and technology do not unidirectionally
shape our values, norms and social order. In a very symmetrical way, our sense of how we ought to
govern and organise ourselves simultaneously and profoundly affects what we make of nature, soci-
ety and ‘the real world’. The concept of ‘co-production’ explicitly foregrounds this two-way dynamic.
‘Briefly stated, co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we
know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which
we choose to live in it. (… ) Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of
reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, dis-
courses, instruments and institutions – in short, in all the building blocks of what we term the
social. The same can be said even more forcefully of technology.’ (Jasanoff 2004, 2-3)
From such a co-productionist perspective, Jasanoff (2015, 4) introduces the interesting analytic
concept of ‘socio-technical imaginaries’ (STI): ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and pub-
licly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social
life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’.
Theoretically, STI occupy a blank space between social theory that has conceptualised imagin-
ation as an intersubjective practice and paid attention to how societies construct common narra-
tives, and STS that opened a space for the material aspects of order by highlighting science and
technology as key sites for the constitution of social imaginaries. As a co-productionist concept,
STI also bridges the epistemic and the normative, the objective and the subjective. The construc-
tion of STI blurs the lines between real and imagined realities by ‘producing authoritative repre-
sentations of how the world works – as well as how it should work’ (Jasanoff 2015, 6). As an
analytic concept, STI allows to address this normative dimension, e.g. through the interplay
between utopia, positive imaginations of desired or desirable futures and the obverse: negative
dystopia, shared fears of harms related to socio-technical inventions or innovations. It also opens
up a space for addressing the political dimension of the issues at stake, i.e. the processes of
inclusion and exclusion of imaginations, desires, fears, hopes, etc. As Jasanoff (2015) emphasises,
multiple imaginaries co-exist in a society, be it in tension with each other or in a productive, dia-
lectic relationship. Being attentive to that allows exploring the struggle over the power to ele-
vate some imagined futures above others. Moreover, the concept enables us to connect the
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production of power and of social and political order with the creativity and innovation in sci-
ence and technology. In this respect, Jasanoff (2015, 13) refers to Michel Foucault’s work to elab-
orate on ‘the constructedness of seeing’. While the viewer constructs what s/he sees, all the
same his/her capacity for observation is socially trained in ways that delimit perception.
Historical conditioning and the choices and exclusions inherent in it affect what can be seen and
what passes unnoticed. Whereas the socially conditioned eye can easily take for granted particu-
lar orders of things as rightful4, exploring a diversity of STI may open-up possibilities for other
ways of seeing and reasoning to enter anyone’s imagination when science and technology inter-
act with individual self-awareness and the sense of being well-ruled. This may give rise to forms
of disorder, to organised criticism or opposition, to changes in expectations, and to the creation
of new collectives through technological as well as social means.
An alternative for objectivist and relativist epistemologies
The reason for selecting these STS concepts as key building blocks for the conceptual framework
(see below) is their strong potential to inspire alternatives to the dualist worldview that is domin-
ant in the Modernist Constitution. As I will further elaborate below, connecting these epistemo-
logical concepts to didactic research frameworks is very promising in view of progressing
investigations and insight in how ESE can overcome the problems of both objectivist and relativ-
ist approaches to teaching and learning. Latour and Jasanoff offer us some interesting concep-
tual pathways to overcome the pitfalls addressed in the four above elaborated critiques. Latour’s
attention for how facts, truth and, hence, our common world are composed, i.e. constructed as
well as Jasanoff’s emphasis on how mutually embedded scientific knowledge, technological
objects and social orders are co-produced through a multiplicity of interventions, are ways to
explicitly and consciously acknowledge what happens in practices. STS scholars’ efforts to concep-
tualise and document the social embeddedness of the making of science is very helpful to avoid
or counteract undue segregations of scientific, ethical, aesthetical and political practice. In line
with this, their consistent resistance to dichotomies such as facts-values, science-politics, nature-
society, object-subject, etc. allows to avoid all too partial, reductionist views of reality distorted by
either naïve realism or idealism. Instead, they make us attentive to how the inextricable
entanglement of factual knowledge claims, personal preferences, tangible effects of sustainability
problems, dreams for the future, scientific insights, ethical considerations, passions, regulations,
etc. that constitute sustainability issues dissolve the artificial boundaries of such a dualist world-
view. Both scholars also offer ways of thinking and seeing that allow to engage with the political
dimension of the issues addressed. As mentioned, Latour characterises (scientific) constructions
and compositions as an utmost political practice. Jasanoff, too, addresses the normative dimen-
sion of (un)desired futures, processes of prioritisation, inclusion and inclusion and associated
struggles over power. The concept of STI, finally, with its the ambition of opening-up possibilities
for other ways of seeing and reasoning and fostering changes, leaves room for creativity.
Although it is important not to overlook how STI contribute to the stability, durability, and
coherence of social arrangements5, I introduce the concept here with a focus on the creative
potential that it also entails. As Jasanoff (2015) argues: ‘It offers unfettered entry into the co-pro-
duced realities of the known, the made, the remembered, and the desired worlds in which we
live, and which we have power to refashion through our creative, collective imaginings.’
From epistemology to didactics: An STS inspired pragmatic framework for in situ
analysis of ESE practices
I will now proceed to the central challenge taken up in this article: translating these epistemo-
logically oriented STS concepts into the domain of didactics6 in view of developing a conceptual
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framework that allows to investigate whether and how objectivist and relativist approaches to
ESE subject matter and teaching take shape in educational practice. Despite their great potential
to inspire such investigations, the STS concepts as such cannot be directly applied to analyse
educational practices. To make this possible, some translation work is needed to connect STS
scholarship to research on teaching and learning. In the remainder of this article I will engage in
this ambition by looking for fruitful cross-fertilisation with work done in educational scholarship.
After all, also educational scholars have elaborately addressed problems related to the objectiv-
ism versus relativism dualism. Pragmatist educational theory, for instance, is built on the anti-
dualist philosophical tradition of pragmatism which makes it well-suited for the purpose of this
paper. Moreover, educational researchers have built on it to develop analytical methods for
empirical investigations of teaching and learning practices. Hence, I will first situate the focus of
this article on the topical post-truth debate, the problems of a dualist worldview and its implica-
tions for ESE within the established tradition of philosophical pragmatism. Then, I connect
Dewey’s pragmatic perspective on education to Latour’s and Jasanoff’s concepts in an attempt
to compose a useful conceptual framework for much-needed empirical research. Finally, I show
how this framework, that serves as a theoretical model, can be operationalised for didactical
empirical research with the help of earlier developed sophisticated analytical methods inspired
by Dewey’s pragmatic, transactional perspective.
A pragmatist approach
Although it arose over 100 years before the current post-truth discussion and stems from ‘a time
when positivism still dominated important American philosophy’ (Marres 2005, 37) pragmatist
theory is utmost relevant and useful to progress thinking about truth, facts and values, relativism
and objectivism, etc. in relation to sustainability issues and education. As will become clear in
the remainder of this paragraph, Latour’s7 constructivism (or ‘compositionism’) and Jasanoff’s co-
production show strong resemblance to the longer established tradition of philosophical prag-
matism. Central in pragmatist theory is a practical perspective on truth and knowledge.
Pragmatism holds a non-essentialist perspective on truth, defining it in terms of usefulness and
acceptance (James 1907). Truth is never absolute – as a stable epistemological equilibrium or
destiny characterised by coherence of ideas with an objective reality – but, rather, consists of
‘temporary resting-places constructed for specific utilitarian ends’ (Rorty 1982, xli). What matters
in this practical understanding of epistemology ‘is not the question whether it produces exact
images of nature as it is, but rather whether its methods and results have consequences that
help us to better accomplish our purposes in line with our values’ (€Ostman and Wickman 2014,
367). Thus, according to William James, we construct truth in the process of successful living in
the world (James 1975, 97), by asking questions such as: ‘What concrete difference will its being
true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be differ-
ent from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-
value in experiential terms?’. Hence, and similar to the compositionist and co-productionist per-
spectives elaborated above, pragmatism views truth and knowledge as constructed. In their
ground-breaking work ‘Knowing and the Known’ John Dewey and Arthur Bentley (1949) interest-
ingly refer to the Latin root of ‘fact’: ‘factum’, which means ‘something done or made’ (Ryan
2011, 51). Analogous with how Latour describes matters of fact as always also matters of concern
and to Jasanoff’s co-productionist perspective, Dewey and Bentley understand what is known as
fact is ‘inseparable from how we determine it to be so’ (Ibid., 51). This reflects their anti-dualist
philosophy centred around the concept of ‘transaction’. Instead of starting from separate subject-
ive minds and real external objects, the transactional perspective sees ‘mind and object as joint
contributors to problem-solving activity’ (Ibid., 36). Thus, transactional pragmatism ‘sees together’
what other philosophies such as rationalism or empiricism ‘see apart’: mind and matter, subject
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and object, self and world. Whereas an interactional perspective looks at a phenomenon or event
as the sum of its constitutive parts – tracing interactions between things that are allocated to
the objective natural world and thoughts that are situated in subjective experiences – the trans-
actional view sees these parts as determined by the whole. Experience, then, already includes
‘the natural realm of encountered things’ (Ibid., 45). Knowing and the known emerge as fully
mutually interdependent: ‘Knowing as the constructive resolution of problems is integral to any-
thing known’ (Ibid., 41). What anything is, cannot be separated from how we come to know and
work with it. In Jasanoff’s terms, we could say that it is co-produced. Highlighting the central
role of experience in their transactional perspective on knowledge and reality, Dewey and
Bentley (1949) can be seen as the precursors of Latour in his attempt to formulate an alternative
to traditional empiricism and realism (see above). Their ‘radical empiricism’ is based on remaining
true to things as they are actually experienced; and this is never in a dualist way of either ‘all-
mind’ or ‘all-matter’ (Ryan 2011, 41). Rather, Dewey’s ‘postulate of immediate experience’ – ‘What
is is what is experiences as’ (Ibid., 24) – draws on Peirce’s and James’ pioneering work on how a
non-reflective unity of subject and object constitute our everyday habits. First when these are
disrupted through unexpected problems that stick and require cognitive inquiry and reflection,
our non-reflective default mode of experience is challenged – and restored once a solution
is achieved.
A transactional perspective on education
The principle of transaction and the focus on experience are also central in Dewey’s understand-
ing of education (see e.g. Dewey 1916; 1934; 1938). Although it was first though his collabor-
ation with Bentley that Dewey consistently used ‘transaction’ as a central notion in his writings,
the transactional perspective can – in retrospect – already be recognised in his earlier writings
on education. When writing ‘Knowing and the Known’, Dewey and Bentley (1949) hoped ‘to rect-
ify misconceptions about Dewey’s worldview caused by his careless use of interactional language
in previous writings’ (Ryan 2011, 4). Indeed, in ‘Experience and Education’, Dewey (1938) elabo-
rates his theory of experience that is underpinned by the principles of ‘continuity’ and
‘interaction’. The latter, however, should not be understood in a causal, linear and mechanistic
way. When arguing that ‘an experience is always what it is because of a transaction taking place
between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment’ Dewey (1938, 43 –
emphasis added) perceives people and their surroundings as mutually interdependent: They
transform continuously and reciprocally, i.e. ‘in transaction’. Human actions change the environ-
ment and shifts of activity happen in response to changing conditions (€Ohman and €Ostman
2007, €Ostman and €Ohman 2010). Learning can then be described in terms of action, i.e. ‘as
meaning making resulting in a more developed and specific repertoire for coordinating activities
and the environment’ (€Ostman and €Ohman 2010, 5). This takes place through a continuous pro-
cess of doing and undergoing the consequences of acts. This is what Dewey (1938, 35) calls the
principle of continuity: ‘every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who acts and
undergoes, while this modification affects, whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent
experiences. For it is a somewhat different person who enters into them. … every experience
both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the
quality of those which come after.’ Education is thus understood as a process that takes place
through encounters between a person and an environment.
The environment is in this transactional perspective understood broadly and encompasses
both the social and physical surroundings. It can consist of persons with whom one is talking,
the subject talked about, a book one is reading, materials used, imaginations, etc. The know-
ledge, meanings, etc. emerging from these encounters are not seen as static cognitive properties
that can be achieved but as something that is dynamically made and transformed in and by
ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION RESEARCH 11
action. Here, it should be stressed that this transactional perspective on education is not deter-
ministic. Only some aspects of the (social and physical) surrounding conditions become actual-
ised in action and thereby become part of an experience, i.e. become ‘an environment’. Thus,
people are not determined by their surroundings but also actively (re)constructs them through
this process of ‘environing’. Analysing how this process takes shape in concrete teaching and
learning practices is a way to gain insight in how knowledge and meaning are constructed. With
the help of well-suited conceptual and analytical tools (see below) this should allow us to investi-
gate whether and how this leads to an objectivist or relativist approach or otherwise.
Learning from experiences, Dewey (1938) further argues, requires ‘inquiry’, that is, testing
ideas and hypotheses by examining and reflecting upon the consequences which they produce
when they are acted upon. It starts from a confrontation with unfamiliar, problematic situations
that arouse ‘an active quest for information and for production of new ideas’ and are as such
‘the stimulus to thinking’ and the drivers for a continuous spiral of learning as ‘new facts and
new ideas thus obtained become the ground for further experiences in which new problems are
presented’ (Ibid., 79). Learning based on inquiry is thus, according to Dewey, closely connected
with the experimental method of science. The scientific method requires careful observation and
reflective review and, according to Dewey, is unique in its approach of ideas as ideas, as hypoth-
eses instead of as final truths. Treating ideas as truths in themselves would take away any reason
for scrupulous examination of them. ‘As fixed truths’, Dewey (Ibid., 86) argues, ‘they must be
accepted and that is the end of the matter’. As hypotheses, however, they must be continuously
tested and revised, thereby taking into account a wide range of information.
A conceptual framework for analysing ESE practice
Connecting this pragmatist perspective on education to the above elaborated STS concepts
allows to construct a conceptual framework for investigations of whether and how ESE practices
move beyond the objectivism versus relativism dichotomy. In particular, the work of Jasanoff
and Latour will be used to further elaborate how processes of environing in ESE practice can
contribute to overcoming objectivism versus relativism dualism or otherwise. Transactional edu-
cational theory will be deployed in view of translating and applying the STS concepts to the con-
text of teaching and learning.
As illustrated in Figure 2, teaching and learning about ecological and sustainability issues take
shape through transactions between people and their environment, i.c. between teachers, stu-
dents and content. It is through the experienced encounters within this so-called didactic tri-
angle8 (e.g. Goodchild and Sriraman 2012) that knowledge (truth) is constructed and meaning
made about the issue at stake. This happens by means of inquiry. As argued, this is a dynamic,
non-deterministic process in which the specificity of the staged encounters give rise to specific
forms of environing. That is, the specific transactions between people and the environment
affect which aspects of the surrounding conditions become actualised in the participants’ experi-
ence and which do not. Important to investigate, then, is how the staged encounters – through
the specific way of organising the content (subject matter) and process (teaching methods) of
education – give rise to a specific sort of inquiry that either enables or hinders to avoid the four
above described pitfalls associated with a dualist approach. As argued, the work of Latour and
Jasanoff is well-suited to inspire this. With regard to the subject matter, one can examine
whether/how environmental and sustainability issues are presented, observed and reflected
upon as matters of concern as well as whether/how attention is paid to the STI related to those
issues. As to the teaching methods, research can focus on whether/how the staged encounters
between students, teachers and content are given shape as what we could call a compositionist
and co-productivist inquiry.
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Before moving on to how this conceptual framework can inform future research, I will first
further explain its different dimensions and try to make it more tangible with some illustrative
practical examples.
Examining if the subject matter is presented and approached as a matter of concern, starts
from the questions which facts, values, concerns, preferences, knowledge claims, opinions, asser-
tions, interests, commitments, etc. that constitute a sustainability issue are enacted and explored
as well as whether/how the entanglement of facts and values is addressed. As I have analysed and
described elsewhere (Van Poeck et al. 2016), education practices differ considerably in this respect.
One case study showed how documentaries made by educators to initiate in-depth exploration
and discussion of sustainability issues such as sustainable fishery, climate change and sustainable
forestry can foster inquiry into the inextricable entanglement of a multiplicity of factual knowledge
claims, personal preferences, tangible effects of sustainability problems, dreams for the future, sci-
entific insights, ethical considerations, passions, regulations, dependencies, lifestyle practices, etc.
The documentaries, as a medium of subject content, but also the way in which the educators dealt
with them9 made it possible to thoroughly study a sustainability issue through the diversity of
those kinds of ‘attachments’ (Marres 2005) involved in it. While making – or, better, ‘composing’–
the documentaries, the educators very consciously made efforts to capture and lay bare this diver-
sity by gathering, connecting and confronting (‘assembling’) as many aspects as possible in an
attempt to add to the reality of the issues at stake. In the observed discussions that followed the
screening of the films, they highlighted the enacted attachments and encouraged the audience to
articulate additional concerns, opinions, knowledge, values, etc. As a result, by watching and dis-
cussing the documentaries, one can learn how a variety of actors are intimately connected by all
kinds of institutional, material, economic, biological, legal,… ties as well as by being commonly
touched, implicated, and mobilised by an issue. The films draw attention to how diverse actors are
bound together by irreconcilable claims, interests, values, preferences, etc. What comes to the fore,
then, is that in order to take care of an issue, one cannot ignore the effects this has on the other
actors caught up in it. Obviously, this way of presenting and approaching sustainability issues as
matters of concern differs considerably from the above described examples in which the ecological
footprint was presented as a matter of fact or a matter of value.
Figure 2. A conceptual framework for investigating other than modern ESE.
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Investigating the subject matter’s attention for STI related to different perspectives on sustain-
ability issues involves analyses of whether/how diverse images of desired futures are addressed
and connected to a variety of visions – utopia as well as dystopia – regarding the role of particu-
lar technologies and scientific insights in relation to imagined forms of social life and social
order. As such, exploring and confronting STI can be considered a very particular way to engage
in a Deweyan inquiry, i.e. to test ideas and hypotheses by examining and reflecting upon the
future consequences which they would produce if acted upon. In education practice, implicit STI
underlying diverse claims and opinions regarding sustainability controversies often remain unad-
dressed. Again, the two ecological footprint examples show how educators approach this subject
content either at the level of proper behaviour (including the proper use of technological arte-
facts such as a shower or a bath) or at the level of opinions and preferences regarding the desir-
ability of a particular lifestyle, yet without connecting the addressed forms of social life, factual
knowledge claims and technologies to imaginaries of different kinds of desired futures. Yet, it
may be very interesting from an educational point of view to challenge the students in the reli-
gion course, for instance, to articulate and explore diverse STI (e.g. the one that implicitly under-
lies the documentary of ‘Low Impact Man’ as well as their own image of a desired future), to
confront this with the consequences of their choice to not limit the ecological impact of their
lifestyles within the planetary boundaries and to try to re-imagine alternative configurations of
future visions, forms of life and the roles attributed to the technologies that shape our lifestyles.
Researching how teaching methods can facilitate compositionist inquiry has to do with grasp-
ing whether and how the employed methods not only invite students to explore how sustain-
ability issues are composed in particular discourses and practices but also to engage in
composing, decomposing and/or recomposing sustainability issues within education practice. I
observed and described an example of that in a case study of a guided tour of a CSA farm
(Community Supported Agriculture) for a group of bioscience engineering students in the con-
text of a master course on ‘sustainable production systems’ (see Van Poeck and Vandenabeele
2014; Van Poeck and €Ostman 2017). It was the farmer who guided the tour, starting with an
extensive elaboration of why and how he tried to run a sustainable farm. The students made
notes. The farmer’s interventions – i.e. his way of teaching – repeatedly encouraged the students
to react on what he said, even to contradict his opinions and to bring in their own point of
view. He grasped opportunities brought about by (sometimes coincidental and unexpected)
observations and encounters during the walk on the farm to further explore and discuss the
issue of sustainable agriculture. Throughout the activity, more and more students got involved in
the discussion, an abundance of concerns, claims, considerations and points of view were raised
and the discussion meanders between post-war European agriculture policy, famine, subsidies,
pesticides, bio-dynamic farming techniques, shortage of agricultural land, meat production and
consumption, GMO technology, phytophthora, distribution chains, consumers’ choices, industrial
food production, etc. As such, the topic of sustainable farming came to the fore as something
that can be – and is – composed in diverse ways. The interaction between students and the
farmer also resulted in a continuous de- and re-composition of the issues as stake. For instance,
the farmer’s composition of unsustainable agriculture as a consequence of European policy was
de-composed by students’ objections and alternative arguments, re-composing the issue as a
matter of famers’ and consumers’ choices. Being exposed to a multiplicity of compositions invites
the students to take a personal stand (see Van Poeck and Vandenabeele 2014) and makes them
aware of the interests, passions, commitments, values, ideals, concerns, etc. at stake for the
diverse actors involved in agriculture, the entanglement of irreconcilable private and public inter-
ests, and the need to make decisions about what to care about.
Investigating whether/how teaching methods give rise to co-productivist inquiry, finally,
focuses on the question whether and, if so, how encounters between students, teachers and
subject content foster awareness about and reflection on how the way in which we (learn to)
know the world – i.c. how knowledge is constructed in the classroom – is inextricably connected
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to how we choose to live in it. Following Jasanoff, it should be realised that this co-productionist
tendency is inherent in any education practice. €Ostman’s (1996) empirical investigations of sci-
ence textbooks interestingly reveal how the presented knowledge about the world is indeed
always entangled with specific views of nature and how to treat it. When, for example, a chemis-
try textbook contains knowledge on how air can be used to produce raw materials for use in
various operations, nature becomes something that can and should be exploited for promoting
human beings’ material welfare. Thus, the presented knowledge offers students very particular
strategies and technologies for reasoning about the world and their place in it while omitting
others. As such, the learning of knowledge is always accompanied by the learning of values and
the knowledge content of textbooks also functions as socialisation content. It holds the potential
to create identities and to affect how students perceive themselves in relation to nature and
their fellow human beings, thereby justifying or strengthening certain power relations in society.
In education, there is thus always a certain meaning-making in the forefront, while other mean-
ings follow automatically, in the background: companion meanings (Roberts and €Ostman 1998).
Every teaching activity inevitably involves choices about what to include and what is left out but
this often remains implicit. In their way of teaching and dealing with such inclusions and exclu-
sions, teachers largely affect the room for creating awareness and reflection on the co-produc-
tion of our knowledge about the world and our preferences regarding how to live in it. One can
teach, for instance, about the ecological footprint with exclusive attention for scientific facts and
calculations about the ecological impact of certain behaviour, thereby offering very particular
companion meanings that serve as socialisation content for how to live in the world as an eco-
logical citizen. In doing so, a teacher can ignore all alternative considerations or perspectives
raised by the students or re-frame them into the logic of indisputable matters of fact (for an
example, see Van Poeck and €Ostman 2017). Inversely, the religion teacher in the example above
organised a classroom discussion in which she did not encourage the students to connect their
idea about how they want to live in the world with knowledge about the ecological implication
of their choice. The aforementioned CSA farmer, on the other hand, repeatedly connected know-
ledge claims made and arguments used to diverse views on the kind of agricultural system we
want and also very explicitly related his own arguments and opinions to how he wants to
‘change the world’ and ‘do something useful’ (Van Poeck and Vandenabeele 2014, 229) by
engaging in a form of agriculture that ‘puts the planet first’. Explicitly exploring the connections
between our knowledge of the world and the way in which we want to live in it – alternating
between what is fore-fronted and backgrounded – can foster an inquiry into the co-production
of knowledge and values. Thus, neither scientific facts (e.g. on the ecological footprint) nor per-
sonal preferences are presented as the only possible way to approach an issue.
From a conceptual framework to empirical analyses
The examples described above are merely meant to illustrate the key dimensions of the concep-
tual framework. Obviously, applying this framework to concrete empirical case studies requires a
much more in-depth analysis and demands further operationalisation in line with a specific
research focus and questions. Such research is much-needed in order to progress the debate on
ESE in a post-truth era by nourishing it with thorough empirical underpinning that can move the
discussion beyond the level of general principles. Vital questions that need to be addressed in
case studies are, for instance: How do/can the staged encounters between teachers, students
and content…
 affect how truth is approached in ESE practice? Is it approached as absolute or temporary? Is
attention paid to how truth is constructed? Do teachers and students address questions of
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logical truth and/or topical truth? Which questions/concerns arise in discussions over top-
ical truth?
 enable ‘pluralistic’ ESE (see introduction) in a way that avoids the danger of relativism?
Under which conditions?
 encourage students to be critical? Does criticism take the form of debunking (deconstruct-
ing) or of assembling? How does this affect the meaning-making about the issue
under study?
 open-up possibilities for new ways of seeing and reasoning? Under which conditions?
Beyond the above presented theoretical model, addressing such questions demands a sophis-
ticated analytical lens that allows to operationalise the conceptual framework for empirical inves-
tigations. Important thereby is that the practical perspective on epistemology and education that
underpins the framework requires operationalisation through equally practical analytical meth-
ods. Luckily, we do not have to start from scratch for this analytical work. Educational researchers
have already developed didactical analytical methods inspired by Dewey’s pragmatic, transac-
tional perspective (€Ostman and €Ohman 2010, €Ostman 2010) and applied them for empirical stud-
ies in science education and ESE, e.g.: Practical Epistemology Analysis (Wickman and €Ostman
2002) enables a ‘high-resolution’ analysis (€Ostman 2010, 83) of how meaning is created in educa-
tional practice, Epistemological Move Analysis (Lidar et al. 2006) and Political Move Analysis (Van
Poeck and €Ostman 2017) allow to investigate the impact of teachers’ interventions on students’
learning, Transactional Argumentation Analysis (Rudsberg et al. 2013) facilitates investigations of
how people learn from deliberative discussions, etc. In combination with the presented concep-
tual framework, these have great potential to inspire sophisticated empirical investigations of
how ESE practices can avoid the pitfalls involved in an objectivist as well as a relativist approach.
Discussion and conclusion
As mentioned, the aim of this article is to progress theoretical and empirical research on how
ESE practices can move beyond the objectivism versus relativism dichotomy. By developing and
presenting a conceptual framework for such investigations, my hope is that a growing body of
varied case studies can contribute to a deeper and empirically grounded understanding of this
topic. Taking into consideration Latour’s important appeal to move away from the irrelevant dis-
cussions about whether something is constructed or not, toward the crucial question whether it
is well or badly constructed, an important challenge for ESE research is to gain insight in the con-
ditions and criteria that constitute ‘good’ and ‘bad’ constructions in the specific context of edu-
cational settings. Such research is much-needed in the context of the current post-truth debate
if we want to acknowledge and embrace the constructedness of facts, knowledge and truth
without falling into approaches ‘in which bullshit is highly valued’ (Sismondo 2017, 3).
As argued above, this article’s contribution should be understood as an attempt to inspire
and facilitate such research. I have shed some light on its potential to do so in the previous
paragraph. Now I will conclude with pointing out two important limitations of the presented
framework, i.e. two potential pitfalls one needs to bear in mind while using it. First, as €Ohman
and €Ostman (2007, 53) argue, ‘in striving to avoid dualism it is tempting to replace it with a uni-
versal claim for holism, and in this way exchange one metaphysical standpoint for another’. The
anti-dualist perspective that fosters the search for an approach to ESE beyond objectivism versus
relativism should thus not be understood as universal category, as a utopian, ‘new’, and thus
fixed or static ‘position’. As argued elsewhere (Van Poeck et al. 2016) that what Latour (2004a)
labels a ‘fair position’ dealing with matters of concern cannot be understood as a particular,
well-defined position in the sense of a point of view from which one approaches reality the
‘right’ way. Rather, it is a time and space where, on the contrary, a multiplicity of standpoints
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can be explored while switching perspective from one to another. ‘The great thing about a
standpoint’, Latour (2004b, 65) argues, ‘is, precisely, that you can change it!’. This is in line with
€Ostman and €Ohman’s (2010) argument that the problem with a dualistic approach is not so
much that it makes distinctions but rather that the distinctions are preconceived. Hence, the pre-
sented framework should only be used as an analytical tool, never as a prescriptive or assess-
ment framework for an anti-dualist approach ‘beyond objectivism and relativism’ as an
educational ideal. And in using it for research on educational practices, it is vital to remain faith-
ful to the pragmatic logic underlying its construction in view of specific purposes. This is aptly
described by Dewey and Bentley (1949): ‘Our assertion is the right to see in union what it
becomes important to see in union; together with the right to see in separation what it is
important to see in separation’ (quoted in Ryan 2011, 40). It is thus not ‘the’ tool but ‘a’ tool
(Ibid., 40) useful for specific research purposes and questions. This brings us to a second, related,
limitation, i.e. that the conceptual framework should not be conflated with a theory of non-dual-
ist teaching and learning about environmental and sustainability issues. The developed theoret-
ical model is an analytical framework with the ambition to foster further inquiry, not at all to
stop the need for such inquiry by providing general and universal explanations of phenomena,
events and practices (€Ostman and €Ohman 2010). With their transactional perspective, Dewey and
Bentley never aimed at introducing a new universal theory or ontology, yet at presenting a
method of inquiry, of investigation. Analogously, this paper presented an analytical framework
hoping that the findings emerging from its application in a variety of analyses may eventually
contribute to an empirically grounded theoretical knowledge base.
Notes
1. This, obviously, affects the matters of fact that are created and scientists involved in the practice of
measuring and calculating footprints also recognise the limitations of their activities. Damaging environmental
consequences of how we use the land (e.g. soil erosion and the overuse of water reserves), for instance,
simply cannot be assessed since that would require data sets that do not exist (Pearce 2013).
2. See Van Poeck & €Ostman (2017) for an empirical example in a case study of an ecological footprint workshop:
The participants reflected and deliberated on how to deal with different, conflicting concerns such as factual
knowledge about ecological benefits of reducing car traffic, concerns about a lack of time, the safety of their
young children if they travel by bicycle, etc. In this conversation, both facts and values were raised and
acknowledged as legitimate elements in making a decision.
3. ‘Cars as we know them’, for instance, ‘would never have taken to the roads without the myriad social roles,
institutions, and practices spawned by modernity: scientists, engineers, and designers; patents and
trademarks; autoworkers and big corporations; regulators; dealers and distributors; advertising companies; and
users, from commuters to racers, who ultimately gave cars their utility, appeal, and meaning.’ (Jasanoff 2015).
4. Jasanoff refers to examples such as all-male orchestras and all-black passengers on the backseats of busses.
5. Analysing and discussing the development of nuclear energy in USA and South-Korea, for instance, Jasanoff
and Kim (2015) have used the concept of STI to show how institutionally stabilised imaginaries shape
subsequent developments rather than that they open-up possibilities.
6. I use the term ‘didactics’ here in line with the Continental, Northern European tradition in which the term
(‘Didaktik’) is closely related to the reflexive pedagogic idea of ‘Bildung’ and thus differs considerably from
the more narrow and instrumental use of it in Anglo-Saxon contexts focusing on methods, instruction and
learning outcomes.
7. Some scholars have actually explicitly situated Latour’s work within the pragmatist tradition (e.g.
Dijstelbloem 2007).
8. In its simplest form, the didactical triangle is a heuristic focusing on the three fundamental components of
teaching and learning practices: teacher, student and content. It serves for analysing didactic systems with a
focus on the relations between these components. Extended models of the didactic triangle have been
created in view of more sophisticated analyses that also take into account, for instance, the societal context
beyond the classroom (Hudson and Meyer 2011). For reasons of clarity, however, I use the basic heuristic in
this conceptual framework.
9. See Figure 2: As the dotted line between ‘content’ and ‘process’ indicates, it is impossible to sharply separate
(the effect of) subject matter and teaching methods in education practices. As such, the division between
both in the framework should be understood as an analytical distinction. In line with the transactional
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educational theory underpinning the model, it is important to realise that content and process continuously
and reciprocally affect one another through the staged encounters between subject content, students and
teachers. Hence the didactic triangle overlapping the content and process sphere in the figure.
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